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Abstract
A honeypot is a closely monitored network decoy serving several purposes: it can distract adversaries from more
valuable machines on a network, can provide early warning about new attack and exploitation trends, or allow
in-depth examination of adversaries during and after exploitation of a honeypot. Deploying a physical honeypot is
often time intensive and expensive as different operating systems require specialized hardware and every honeypot
requires its own physical system. This paper presents Honeyd, a framework for virtual honeypots that simulates
virtual computer systems at the network level. The simulated computer systems appear to run on unallocated
network addresses. To deceive network fingerprinting tools, Honeyd simulates the networking stack of different
operating systems and can provide arbitrary routing topologies and services for an arbitrary number of virtual
systems. This paper discusses Honeyd’s design and shows how the Honeyd framework helps in many areas of
system security, e.g. detecting and disabling worms, distracting adversaries, or preventing the spread of spam
email.
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1 Introduction
Internet security is increasing in importance as more
and more business is conducted there. Yet, despite
decades of research and experience, we are still unable
to make secure computer systems or even measure their
security.
As a result, exploitation of newly discovered vul-
nerabilities often catches us by surprise. Exploit au-
tomation and massive global scanning for vulnerabil-
ities enable adversaries to compromise computer sys-
tems shortly after vulnerabilities become known [23].
One way to get early warnings of new vulnerabilities
is to install and monitor computer systems on a net-
work that we expect to be broken into. Every attempt
to contact these systems via the network is suspect.
We call such a system a honeypot. If a honeypot is
compromised, we study the vulnerability that was used
to compromise it. A honeypot may run any operating
system and any number of services. The configured ser-
vices determine the vectors an adversary may choose
to compromise the system.
A physical honeypot is a real machine with its own
IP address. A virtual honeypot is simulated by another
machine that responds to network traffic sent to the
virtual honeypot.
Virtual honeypots are attractive because they re-
quirer fewer computer systems, which reduces mainte-
nance costs. Using virtual honeypots, it is possible to
populate a network with hosts running numerous op-
erating systems. To convince adversaries that a virtual
honeypot is running a given operating system, we need
to simulate the TCP/IP stack of the target operating
system carefully, in order to fool TCP/IP stack finger-
printing tools like Xprobe [1] or Nmap [7].
This paper describes the design and implementation
of Honeyd, a framework for virtual honeypots that sim-
ulates computer systems at the network level. Honeyd
supports the IP protocol suites [24] and responds to
network requests for its virtual honeypots according to
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the services that are configured for each virtual honey-
pot. When sending a response packet, Honeyd’s per-
sonality engine makes it match the network behavior
of the configured operating system personality.
To simulate real networks, Honeyd creates virtual
networks that consist of arbitrary routing topologies
with configurable link characteristics such as latency
and packet loss. When networking mapping tools like
traceroute are used to probe the virtual network, they
discover only the topologies simulated by Honeyd.
Our experimental evaluation of Honeyd verifies that
fingerprinting tools are deceived by the simulated sys-
tems and that our virtual network topologies seem re-
alistic to network mapping tools.
To demonstrate the power of the Honeyd framework,
we show how it can be used in many areas of system
security. For example, Honeyd can help with detecting
and disabling worms, distracting adversaries, or pre-
venting the spread of spam email.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents background information on honeypots.
In Section 3, we discuss the design and implementa-
tion of Honeyd. Section 4 presents an evaluation of the
Honeyd framework in which we verify that fingerprint-
ing and network mapping tools are fooled to report the
specified system configurations. We describe how Hon-
eyd can help to improve system security in Section 5
and present related work in Section 6. We summarize
and conclude in Section 7.
2 Honeypots
This section presents background information on
honeypots and our terminology. We provide motiva-
tion for their use by comparing honeypots to network
intrusion detection systems (NIDS) [17]. The amount
of useful information provided by NIDS is decreasing
in the face of ever more sophisticated evasion tech-
niques [19, 26] and an increasing number of protocols
that employ encryption to protect network traffic from
eavesdroppers. NIDS also suffer from high false posi-
tive rates that decrease their usefulness even further.
Honeypots can help with some of these problems.
A honeypot is as a closely monitored computing re-
source that we intend to be probed, attacked, or com-
promised. The value of a honeypot is determined by
the information that we can obtain from it. Monitor-
ing the data that enters and leaves a honeypot lets
us gather information that is not available to NIDS.
For example, we can log the key strokes of an inter-
active session even if encryption is used to protect the
network traffic. To detect malicious behavior, NIDS
require signatures of known attacks and often fail to
detect compromises that were unknown at the time it
was deployed. On the other hand, honeypots can de-
tect vulnerabilities that are not yet understood. For
example, we can detect compromise by observing net-
work traffic leaving the honeypot even if the means of
the exploit has never been seen before.
Because a honeypot has no production value, any at-
tempt to contact it is suspicious. Consequently, foren-
sic analysis of data collected from honeypots is less
likely to lead to false positives than data collected by
NIDS.
Honeypots can run any operating system and any
number of services. The configured services determine
the vectors available to an adversary for compromis-
ing or probing the system. A high-interaction honey-
pot simulates all aspects of an operating system. A
low-interaction honeypots simulates only some parts,
for example the network stack [22]. A high-interaction
honeypot can be compromised completely, allowing an
adversary to gain full access to the system and use it
to launch further network attacks. In contrast, low-
interaction honeypots simulate only services that can-
not be exploited to get complete access to the hon-
eypot. Low-interaction honeypots are more limited,
but they are useful to gather information at a higher
level, e.g., learn about network probes or worm activ-
ity. They can also be used to analyze spammers or for
active countermeasures against worms; see Section 5.
We also differentiate between physical and virtual
honeypots. A physical honeypot is a real machine on
the network with its own IP address. A virtual honey-
pot is simulated by another machine that responds to
network traffic sent to the virtual honeypot.
When gathering information about network attacks
or probes, the number of deployed honeypots influ-
ences the amount and accuracy of the collected data. A
good example is measuring the activity of HTTP based
worms [21]. We can identify these worms only after
they complete a TCP handshake and send their pay-
load. However, most of their connection requests will
go unanswered because they contact randomly chosen
IP addresses. A honeypot can capture the worm pay-
load by configuring it to function as a web server. The
more honeypots we deploy the more likely one of them
is contacted by a worm.
Physical honeypots are often high-interaction, so al-
lowing the system to be compromised completely, they
are expensive to install and maintain. For large ad-
dress spaces, it is impractical or impossible to deploy
a physical honeypot for each IP address. In that case,
we need to deploy virtual honeypots.
3 Design and Implementation
In this section, we present Honeyd, a lightweight
framework for creating virtual honeypots. The frame-
work allows us to instrument thousands of IP addresses
with virtual machines and corresponding network ser-
vices. We start by discussing design considerations,
then describe Honeyd’s architecture and implementa-
tion.
We limit adversaries to interacting with our honey-
pots only at the network level. Instead of simulating
every aspect of an operating system, we choose to sim-
ulate only its network stack. The main drawback of
this approach is that an adversary never gains access
to a complete system even if he compromises a simu-
lated service. On the other hand, we are still able to
capture connection and compromise attempts. How-
ever, we can mitigate these drawbacks by combining
Honeyd with a virtual machine like Vmware [25]. This
is discussed in the related work section. For that rea-
son, Honeyd is a low-interaction virtual honeypot that
simulates TCP and UDP services. It also understands
and responds correctly to ICMP messages.
Honeyd must be able to handle virtual honeypots
on multiple IP addresses simultaneously, in order to
populate the network with numerous virtual honeypots
simulating different operating systems and services. To
increase the realism of our simulation, the framework
must be able to simulate arbitrary network topologies.
To simulate address spaces that are topologically dis-
persed and for load sharing, the framework also needs
to support network tunneling.
Figure 1 shows a conceptual overview of the frame-
work’s operation. A central machine intercepts net-
work traffic sent to the IP addresses of configured hon-
eypots and simulates their responses. Before we de-
scribe Honeyd’s architecture, we explain how network
packets for virtual honeypots reach the Honeyd host.
3.1 Receiving Network Data
Honeyd is designed to reply to network packets
whose destination IP address belongs to one of the sim-
Figure 1: Honeyd receives traffic for its virtual honeypots
via a router or Proxy ARP. For each honeypot, Honeyd
can simulate the network stack behavior of a different
operating system.
ulated honeypots. For Honeyd, to receive the correct
packets, the network needs to be configured appropri-
ately. There are several ways to do this, e.g., we can
create special routes for the virtual IP addresses that
point to the Honeyd host, or we can use Proxy ARP [3],
or we can use network tunnels.
Let A be the IP address of our router and B the IP
address of the Honeyd host. In the simplest case, the
IP addresses of virtual honeypots lie within our local
network. We denote them V1, . . . , Vn. When an adver-
sary sends a packet from the Internet to honeypot Vi,
router A receives and attempts to forward the packet.
The router queries its routing table to find the forward-
ing address for Vi. There are three possible outcomes:
the router drops the packet because there is no route
to Vi, router A forwards the packet to another router,
or Vi lies in local network range of the router and thus
is directly reachable by A.
We use the latter two cases to direct traffic for Vi to
B. The easiest way is to configure routing entries for Vi
with 1 ≤ i ≤ n that point to B. In that case, the router
forwards packets for our virtual honeypots directly to
the Honeyd host. If no special route has been config-
ured, the router ARPs to determine the MAC address
of the virtual honeypot. As there is no correspond-
ing physical machine, the ARP requests go unanswered
and the router drops the packet after a few retries. We
configure the Honeyd host to reply to ARP requests for
Vi with its own MAC addresses. This is called Proxy
ARP and allows the router to send packets for Vi to
B’s MAC address.
In more complex environments, it is possible to tun-
nel network address space to a Honeyd host. We use
Figure 2: This diagram gives an overview of Honeyd’s
architecture. Incoming packets are dispatched to the cor-
rect protocol handler. For TCP and UDP, the configured
services receive new data and send responses if neces-
sary. All outgoing packets are modified by the personality
engine to mimic the behavior of the configured network
stack. The routing component is optional and used only
when Honeyd simulates network topologies.
the generic routing encapsulation (GRE) [9, 10] tun-
neling protocol described in detail in Section 3.4.
3.2 Architecture
Honeyd’s architecture consists of several compo-
nents: a configuration database, a central packet dis-
patcher, protocol handlers, a personality engine, and
an optional routing component; see Figure 2.
Incoming packets are processed by the central packet
dispatcher. It first checks the length of an IP packet
and verifies the packet’s checksum. The framework is
aware of the three major Internet protocols: ICMP,
TCP and UDP. Packets for other protocols are logged
and silently discarded.
Before it can process a packet, the dispatcher must
query the configuration database to find a honeypot
configuration that corresponds to the destination IP
address. If no specific configuration exists, a default
template is used. Given a configuration, the packet and
corresponding configuration is handed to the protocol
specific handler.
The ICMP protocol handler supports most ICMP
requests. By default, all honeypot configurations re-
spond to echo requests and process destination un-
reachable messages. The handling of other requests
depends on the configured personalities as described
in Section 3.3.
For TCP and UDP, the framework can establish con-
nections to arbitrary services. Services are external
applications that receive data on stdin and send their
output to stdout. The behavior of a service depends en-
tirely on the external application. When a connection
request is received, the framework checks if the packet
is part of an established connection. In that case, any
new data is sent to the already started service appli-
cation. If the packet contains a connection request, a
new process is created to run the appropriate service.
Instead of creating a new process for each connection,
the framework supports subsystems. A subsystem is
an application that runs in the name space of the vir-
tual honeypot. The subsystem specific application is
started when the corresponding virtual honeypot is in-
stantiated. A subsystem can bind to ports, accept con-
nections, and initiate network traffic.
Honeyd contains a simplified TCP state machine.
The three-way handshake for connection establishment
and connection teardown via FIN or RST are fully sup-
ported, but receiver and congestion window manage-
ment is not fully implemented.
UDP datagrams are passed directly to the applica-
tion. When the framework receives a UDP packet for
a closed port, it sends an ICMP port unreachable mes-
sage unless this is forbidden by the configured personal-
ity. In sending ICMP port unreachable messages, the
framework allows network mapping tools like tracer-
oute to discover the simulated network topology.
In addition to establishing a connection to a lo-
cal service, the framework also supports redirection of
connections. The redirection may be static or it can
depend on the connection quadruple (source address,
source port, destination address and destination port).
Redirection lets us to forward a connection request for
a service on a virtual honeypot to a service running
on a real server. For example, we can redirect DNS
requests to a proper name server. Or we can reflect
connections back to an adversary, e.g. just for run we
might redirect an SSH connection back to the origi-
nating host and cause the adversary to attack her own
SSH server. Evil laugh.
Before a packet is sent to the network, it is processed
by the personality engine. The personality engine ad-
justs the packet’s content so that it appears to originate
from the network stack of the configured operating sys-
tem.
3.3 Personality Engine
Adversaries commonly run fingerprinting tools like
Xprobe [1] or Nmap [7] to gather information about a
target system. It is important that honeypots do not
stand out when fingerprinted. To make them appear
real to a probe, Honeyd simulates the network stack
Fingerprint IRIX 6.5.15m on SGI O2
TSeq(Class=TD%gcd=<104%SI=<1AE%IPID=I%TS=2HZ)
T1(DF=N%W=EF2A%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%Ops=MNWNNTNNM)
T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=)
T3(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=EF2A%ACK=O%Flags=A%Ops=NNT)
T4(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=R%Ops=)
T5(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%Ops=)
T6(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=R%Ops=)
T7(DF=N%W=0%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=)
PU(Resp=N)
Figure 3: An example of an Nmap fingerprint that speci-
fies the network stack behavior of a system running IRIX.
behavior of a given operating system. We call this the
personality of a virtual honeypot. Different personali-
ties can be assigned to different virtual honeypots. The
personality engine makes a honeypot’s network stack
behave as specified by the personality by introducing
changes into the protocol headers of every outgoing
packet so that they match the characteristics of the
configured operating system.
The framework uses Nmap’s fingerprint database as
its reference for a personality’s TCP and UCP behav-
ior; Xprobe’s fingerprint database is used as reference
for a personality’s ICMP behavior.
Next, we explain how we use the information pro-
vided by Nmap’s fingerprints to change the character-
istics of a honeypot’s network stack.
Each Nmap fingerprint has a format similar to the
example shown in Figure 3. We use the string after
the Fingerprint token as the personality name. The
lines after the name describe the results for nine differ-
ent tests. The first test is the most comprehensive. It
determines how the network stack of the remote oper-
ating system creates the initial sequence number (ISN)
for TCP SYN segments. Nmap indicates the difficulty
of predicting ISNs in the Class field. Predictable ISNs
post a security problem because they allow an adver-
sary to spoof connections [2]. The gcd and SI field
provide more detailed information about the ISN dis-
tribution. The first test also determines how IP identi-
fication numbers and TCP timestamps are generated.
The next seven tests determine the stack’s behavior
for packets that arrive on open and closed TCP ports.
The last test analyzes the ICMP response packet to a
closed UDP port.
The framework keeps state for each honeypot. The
state includes information about ISN generation, the
boot time of the honeypot and the current IP packet
identification number. Keeping state is necessary so
that we can generate subsequent ISNs that follow the
distribution specified by the fingerprint.
Figure 4: The diagram shows the structure of the TCP
header. Honeyd changes options and other parameters to
match the behavior of network stacks.
Nmap’s fingerprinting is mostly concerned with an
operating system’s TCP implementation. TCP is a
stateful, connection-oriented protocol that provides er-
ror recovery and congestion control [18]. TCP also sup-
ports additional options, not all of which implemented
by all systems. The size of the advertised receiver win-
dows varies between implementations and is used by
Nmap as part of the fingerprint.
When the framework sends a packet for a newly es-
tablished TCP connection, it uses the Nmap fingerprint
to see the initial window size. After a connection has
been established, the framework adjusts the window
size according to the amount of buffered data.
If TCP options present in the fingerprint have been
negotiated during connection establishment, then Hon-
eyd inserts them into the response packet. The frame-
work uses the fingerprint to determine the frequency
with which TCP timestamps are updated. For most
operating systems, the update frequency is 2 Hz.
Generating the correct distribution of initial se-
quence numbers is tricky. Nmap obtains six ISN sam-
ples and analyzes their consecutive differences. Nmap
recognizes several ISN generation types: constant dif-
ferences, differences that are multiples of a constant,
completely random differences, time dependent and
random increments. To differentiate between the lat-
ter two cases, Nmap calculates the greatest common
divisor (gcd) and standard deviation for the collected
differences.
The framework keeps track of the last ISN that was
generated by each honeypot and its generation time.
For new TCP connection requests, Honeyd uses a for-
mula that approximates the distribution described by
Figure 5: The diagram shows the structure of an ICMP
port unreachable message. Honeyd introduces errors into
the quoted IP header to match the behavior of network
stacks.
the fingerprint’s gcd and standard deviation. In this
way, the generated ISNs match the generation class
that Nmap expects for the particular operating system.
For the IP header, Honeyd adjusts the generation
of the identification number. It can either be zero,
increment by one, or random.
For ICMP packets, the personality engine uses the
PU test entry to determine how the quoted IP header
should be modified using the associated Xprobe finger-
print for further information. Some operating systems
modify the incoming packet by changing fields from
network to host order and as a result quote the IP and
UDP header incorrectly. Honeyd introduces these er-
rors if necessary. Figure 5 shows an example for an
ICMP destination unreachable message. The frame-
work also supports the generation of other ICMP mes-
sages, not described here due to space considerations.
3.4 Routing Topology
Honeyd can simulate arbitrary virtual routing
topologies, so it is not always possible to use Proxy
ARP to direct the packets to the Honeyd host. In-
stead, we need to configure routers to delegate network
address space to our host.
Normally, the virtual routing topology is a tree
rooted where packets enter the virtual routing topol-
ogy. Each interior node of the tree represents a router
and each edge a link that contains latency and packet
loss characteristics. Terminal nodes of the tree corre-
spond to networks. The framework supports multiple
entry points that can exit in parallel. An entry router is
chosen by the network space for which it is responsible.
To simulate an asymmetric network topology, we
consult the routing tables when a packet enters the
framework and again when it leaves the framework; see
Figure 2. In this case, the network topology resembles
a directed acyclic graph1.
1Although it is possible to configure routing loops, this is
When the framework receives a packet, it finds the
correct entry routing tree and traverses it, starting at
the root until it finds a node that contains the destina-
tion IP address of the packet. Packet loss and latency
of all edges on the path are accumulated to determine if
the packet is dropped and how long its delivery should
be delayed.
The framework also decrements the time to live
(TTL) field of the packet for each traversed router. If
the TTL reaches zero, the framework sends an ICMP
time exceeded message with the source IP address of
the router that causes the TTL to reach zero.
For network simulations, it is possible to integrate
real systems into the virtual routing topology. When
the framework receives a packet for a real system, it
traverses the topology until it finds a virtual router
that is directly responsible for the network space that
the real machine belongs to. The framework sends an
ARP request if necessary to discover the hardware ad-
dress of the system, then encapsulates the packet in
an Ethernet frame. Similarly, the framework responds
with ARP replies from the corresponding virtual router
when the real system sends ARP requests.
We can split the routing topology using GRE to tun-
nel networks. This allows us to load balance across
several Honeyd installations by delegating parts of the
address space to different Honeyd hosts. Using GRE
tunnels, it is also possible to delegate networks that be-
long to separate parts of the address space to a single
Honeyd host. For the reverse route, an outgoing tunnel
is selected based both on the source and the destina-
tion IP address. An example of such a configuration is
described in Section 5.
3.5 Configuration
A virtual honeypots is configured with a template, a
reference for a completely configured computer system.
New templates are created with the create command.
The set and add commands change the configuration
of a template. The set command assigns a personality
from the Nmap fingerprint file to a template. The per-
sonality determines the behavior of the network stack,
as discussed in Section 3.3. The set command also de-
fines the default behavior for the supported network
protocols. The default behavior is one of the follow-
ing values: block, reset, or open. Block means that
all packets for the specified protocol are dropped by
default. Reset indicates that all ports are closed by
default. Open means that they are all open by default.
The latter settings make a difference only for UDP and
TCP.
normally undesirable and should be avoided.
We specify the services that are remotely accessible
with the add command. In addition to the template
name, we need to specify the protocol, port and the
command to execute for each service. Instead of spec-
ifying a service, Honeyd also recognizes the keyword
proxy that allows us to forward network connections to
a different host. The framework expands the follow-
ing four variables for both the service and the proxy
statement: $ipsrc, $ipdst, $sport, and $dport. Vari-
able expansion allows a service to adapt its behavior
depending on the particular network connection it is
handling. It is also possible to redirect network probes
back to the host that is doing the probing.
The bind command assigns a template to an IP ad-
dress. If no template is assigned to an IP address, we
use the default template. Figure 6 shows an example
configuration that specifies a routing topology and two
templates. The router template mimics the network
stack of a Cisco 7206 router and is accessible only via
telnet. The web server template runs two services: a
simple web server and a forwarder for SSH connections.
In this case, the forwarder redirects SSH connections
back to the connection initiator. A real machine is in-
tegrated into the virtual routing topology at IP address
10.1.0.3.
3.6 Logging
The Honeyd framework supports several ways of log-
ging network activity. It can create connection logs
that report attempted and completed connections for
all protocols. More usefully, information can be gath-
ered from the services themselves. Service applications
can report data to be logged to Honeyd via stderr. The
framework uses syslog to store the information on the
system. In most situations, we expect that Honeyd
runs in conjunction with a NIDS.
4 Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation of Honeyd’s abil-
ity to create virtual network topologies and to mimic
different network stacks.
We start Honeyd with a configuration similar to the
one shown in Figure 6 and use traceroute to find the
routing path to a virtual host. We notice that the mea-
sured latency is double the latency that we configured.
This is correct because packets have to traverse each
link twice.
Running Nmap against IP addresses 10.0.0.1 and
10.1.0.2 results in the correct identification of the
configured personalities. Nmap reports that 10.0.0.1
seems to be a Cisco router and that 10.1.0.2 seems
route entry 10.0.0.1
route 10.0.0.1 link 10.0.0.0/24
route 10.0.0.1 add net 10.1.0.0/16 10.1.0.1 latency 55ms loss 0.1
route 10.0.0.1 add net 10.2.0.0/16 10.2.0.1 latency 20ms loss 0.1
route 10.1.0.1 link 10.1.0.0/24
route 10.2.0.1 link 10.2.0.0/24
create routerone
set routerone personality "Cisco 7206 running IOS 11.1(24)"
set routerone default tcp action reset
add routerone tcp port 23 "scripts/router-telnet.pl"
create netbsd
set netbsd personality "NetBSD 1.5.2 running on a Commodore Amiga (68040 processor)"
set netbsd default tcp action reset
add netbsd tcp port 22 proxy $ipsrc:22
add netbsd tcp port 80 "sh scripts/web.sh"
bind 10.0.0.1 routerone
bind 10.1.0.2 netbsd
bind 10.1.0.3 to fxp0
Figure 6: An example configuration for Honeyd. The configuration language is a context-free grammar. This example
creates a virtual routing topology and defines two templates: a router that can be accessed via telnet and a host that
is running a web server. A real system is integrated into the virtual routing topology at IP address 10.1.0.3.
to run NetBSD. Xprobe identifies 10.0.0.1 as Cisco
router and lists a number of possible operating systems,
including NetBSD, for 10.1.0.2.
To fully test if the framework fools Nmap, we set up
a B-class network populated with virtual honeypots for
every fingerprint in Nmap’s fingerprint file. After re-
moving duplicates, we found 600 distinct fingerprints.
The honeypots were configured so that all but one port
was closed; the open port ran a web server. We then
launched Nmap against all configured IP addresses and
checked which operating systems Nmap identifies. For
555 fingerprints, Nmap uniquely identified the operat-
ing system simulated by Honeyd. For 37 fingerprints,
Nmap presented a list of possible choices that included
the simulated personality. Nmap failed to identify the
correct operating system for only 8 fingerprints. This
might be a problem of Honeyd, or it could be due to a
badly formed fingerprint database.
5 Applications
In this section, we describe how the Honeyd frame-
work can be used in different areas of system security.
5.1 Network Decoys
The traditional role of a honeypot is that of a net-
work decoy. Our framework can be used to instrument
$ traceroute -n 10.3.0.10
traceroute to 10.3.0.10 (10.3.0.10), 64 hops max
1 10.0.0.1 0.456 ms 0.193 ms 0.93 ms
2 10.2.0.1 46.799 ms 45.541 ms 51.401 ms
3 10.3.0.1 68.293 ms 69.848 ms 69.878 ms
4 10.3.0.10 79.876 ms 79.798 ms 79.926 ms
Figure 7: Using traceroute, we measure a routing path
in the virtual routing topology. The measured latencies
match the configured ones.
the unallocated addresses of a production network with
virtual honeypots. Adversaries that scan the produc-
tion network can potentially be confused and deterred
by the virtual honeypots. In conjunction with a NIDS,
the resulting network traffic may help in getting early
warning of attacks.
5.2 Detecting and Countering Worms
Honeypots are ideally suited to intercept traffic from
adversaries that randomly scan the network. This is
especially true for Internet worms that use some form of
random scanning for new targets [23], e.g. Blaster [5],
Code Red [13], Nimda [4], Slammer [14], etc. In this
section, we show how a virtual honeypot deployment
can be used to detect new worms and how to launch
active countermeasures against infected machines once
Figure 8: The graphs show the simulated worm propagation when immunizing infected hosts that connect to a virtual
honeypot. The left graph shows the propagation if the virtual honeypots are activated one hour after the worm starts
spreading. The right graph shows the propagation if the honeypots are activated after 20 minutes.
a worm has been identified.
To intercept probes from worms, we instrument vir-
tual honeypots on unallocated network addresses. The
probability of receiving a probe depends on the number
of infected machines i, the worm propagation chance
and the number of deployed honeypots h. The worm
propagation chance depends on the worm propagation
algorithm, the number of vulnerable hosts and the size
of the address space. In general, the larger our hon-
eypot deployment the earlier one of the honeypots re-
ceives a worm probe.
To detect new worms, we can use the Honeyd frame-
work in two different ways. We may deploy a large
number of virtual honeypots as gateways in front of a
smaller number of high-interaction honeypots. Hon-
eyd instruments the virtual honeypots. It forwards
only TCP connections that have been established and
only UDP packets that carry a payload that fail to
match a known fingerprint. In such a setting, Hon-
eyd shields the high-interaction honeypots from un-
interesting scanning or backscatter activity. A high-
interaction honeypot like ReVirt [6] is used to de-
tect compromises or unusual network activity. Using
the automated NIDS signature generation proposed
by Kreibich et al. [12], we can then block the de-
tected worm or exploit at the network border. The
effectiveness of this approach has been analyzed by
Moore et al. [15]. To improve it, we can configure Hon-
eyd to replay packets to several high-interaction honey-
pots that run different operating systems and software
versions.
On the other hand, we can use Honeyd’s subsys-
tem support to expose regular UNIX applications like
OpenSSH to worms. This solution is limiting as we are
restricted to detecting worms only for the operating
system that is running the framework and most worms
target Microsoft Windows, not UNIX.
Moore et al. show that containing worms is not
practical on an Internet scale unless a large fraction of
the Internet cooperates in the containment effort [15].
However, with the Honeyd framework, it is possible to
actively counter worm propagation by immunizing in-
fected hosts that contact our virtual honeypots. Anal-
ogous to Moore et al. [15], we can model the effect of
immunization on worm propagation by using the clas-
sic SIR epidemic model [11]. The model states that the
number of newly infected hosts increases linearly with
the product of infected hosts, fraction of susceptible
hosts and contact rate. The immunization is repre-
sented by a decrease in new infections that is linear in
the number of infected hosts:
ds
dt
= −β i(t)s(t)
di
dt
= β i(t)s(t)− γ i(t)
dr
dt
= γ i(t),
where at time t, i(t) is the fraction of infected hosts,
s(t) the fraction of susceptible hosts and r(t) the frac-
tion of immunized hosts. The propagation speed of
the worm is characterized by the contact rate β and
the immunization rate is represented by γ.
We simulate worm propagation based on the param-
eters for a Code-Red like worm [13, 15]. We use 360,000
susceptible machines in a 232 address space and set the
initial worm seed to 150 infected machines. Each worm
launches 50 probes per second. The simulation mea-
sures the effectiveness of using active immunization by
virtual honeypots. The honeypots start working af-
ter a time delay. The time delay represents the time
that is required to detect the worm and install the im-
munization code. We expect that immunization code
can be prepared before a vulnerability is actively ex-
ploited. Figure 8 shows the worm propagation result-
ing from a varying number of instrumented honeypots.
The graph on the left shows the results if the honey-
pots are brought online an hour after the worm started
spreading. The graph on the right shows the results
if the honeypots can be activated within 20 minutes.
If we wait for an hour, all vulnerable machines on the
Internet will be infected. Our chances are better if we
start the honeypots after 20 minutes. In that case,
a deloyment of about 262,000 honeypots is capable of
stopping the worm from spreading.
Alternatively, it would be possible to scan the Inter-
net for vulnerable systems and remotely patch them.
For ethical reasons, this is probably unfeasible. How-
ever, if we can reliably detect an infected machine
with our virtual honeypot framework, then active im-
munization might be an appropriate response. For
the Blaster worm, this idea has been realized by
Oudot et al. [16].
5.3 Spam Prevention
The Honeyd framework can be used to understand
how spammers operate and to automate the identifi-
cation of new spam which can then be submitted to
collaborative spam filters.
In general, spammers abuse two Internet services:
proxy servers [8] and open mail relays. Open proxies
are often used to connect to other proxies or to sub-
mit spam email to open mail relays. Spammers can
use open proxies to anonymize their identity to pre-
vent tracking the spam back to its origin. An open
mail relay accepts email from any sender address to
any recipient address. By sending spam email to open
mail relays, a spammer causes the mail relay to deliver
the spam in his stead.
To understand how spammers operate we use the
Honeyd framework to instrument networks with open
proxy servers and open mail relays. We make use of
Honeyd’s GRE tunneling capabilities and tunnel sev-
eral C-class networks to a central Honeyd host.
We populate our network space with randomly cho-
sen IP addresses and a random selection of services.
Some virtual hosts may run an open proxy and others
may just run an open mail relay or a combination of
both.
When a spammer attempts to send spam email via
Figure 9: Using the Honeyd framework, it is possible to
instrument networks to automatically capture spam and
submit it to collaborative filtering systems.
an open proxy or an open mail relay, the email is
automatically redirected to a spam trap. The spam
trap then submits the collected spam to a collabora-
tive spam filter.
At this writing, Honeyd has received and processed
more than 26,000 spam emails. A detailed evaluation
is the subject of future work.
6 Related Work
There are several areas of research in TCP/IP stack
fingerprinting, among them: effective methods to clas-
sify the remote operating system either by active prob-
ing or by passive analysis of network traffic, and defeat-
ing TCP/IP stack fingerprinting by normalizing net-
work traffic.
Fyodor’s Nmap uses TCP and UDP probes to deter-
mine the operating system of a host [7]. Nmap collects
the responses of a network stack to different queries and
matches them to a signature database to determine the
operating systems of the queried host. Nmap’s finger-
print database is extensive and we use it as the refer-
ence for operating system personalities in Honeyd.
Instead of actively probing a remote host to deter-
mine its operating systems, it is possible to identify the
remote operating system by passively analyzing its net-
work packets. P0f [27] is one such tool. The TCP/IP
flags inspected by P0f are similar to the data collected
in Nmap’s fingerprint database.
On the other hand, Smart et al. show how to de-
feat fingerprinting tools by scrubbing network pack-
ets so that artifacts identifying the remote operating
system are removed [20]. This approach is similar to
Honeyd’s personality engine as both systems change
network packets to influence fingerprinting tools. In
contrast to the fingerprint scrubber that removes iden-
tifiable information, Honeyd changes network packets
to contain artifacts of the configured operating system.
High-interaction virtual honeypots can be
constructed using User Mode Linux (UML) or
Vmware [25]. One example is ReVirt which can
reconstruct the state of the virtual machine for any
point in time [6]. This is very helpful for forensic
analysis after the virtual machine has been compro-
mised. Although high-interaction virtual honeypots
can be fully compromised, it is not easy to instrument
thousands of high-interaction virtual machines due
to their overhead. However, the Honeyd framework
allows us to instrument unallocated network space
with thousands of virtual honeypots. Furthermore,
we may use a combination of Honeyd and virtual
machines to get the benefit of both approaches. In this
case, Honeyd provides network facades and selectively
proxies connections to services to backends provided
by high-interaction virtual machines.
7 Conclusion
Honeyd is a framework for creating virtual honey-
pots. Honeyd mimics the network stack behavior of
operating systems to deceive fingerprinting tools like
Nmap and Xprobe.
We gave an overview of Honeyd’s design and archi-
tecture. Our evaluation shows that Honeyd is effective
in creating virtual routing topologies and successfully
fools fingerprinting tools.
We showed how the Honeyd framework can be de-
ployed to help in different areas of system security, e.g.,
worm detection, worm countermeasures, or spam pre-
vention.
Honeyd is freely available as source code and can
be downloaded from http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/
provos/honeyd/.
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